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United States Antitrust Law in the Global Market
DIANE P. WOOD*
There has never been a time when domestic U.S. antitrust law was not
affected by the global market. From the beginning, while the Sherman Act
was being drafted, Congress recognized the close relationship between tariff
levels and the effectiveness of internal U.S. laws against restraint of trade.'
Other things being equal, high tariffs meant greater power for the huge
businesses that were arising in the late nineteenth century. Thus, there was
a greater need for regulation of monopolistic practices. In addition, a
principal reason why the language of the 1890 Sherman Act prohibited
restraints in both interstate and foreign commerce was the drafters'
awareness that circumvention of the new law would be easy if cartels or
monopolies could evade its scope simply by relocating to Canada or Mexico
or Europe, and exporting products back into the United States.2 The
development of the U.S. doctrine on extraterritorial jurisdiction began
because of the undeniable links between domestic and foreign markets. This
often controversial doctrine holds that ec6nomic activity abroad may be
regulated by U.S. law if it has a sufficient effect in the United States
The topic of this paper is not the application of the U.S. antitrust laws
to various foreign transactions, but rather, the ways in which the existence
of a global market is affecting the theory and application of these laws
within the United States. Some of those effects are already present: the
question of how to properly account for foreign competition in the definition
of relevant markets has been explored in the literature for years;4 the
existence of foreign competition as a factor justifying joint operations
* Harold J. and Marion F. Green Professor of International Legal Studies, The University of
Chicago Law School. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the Sonnenschein Faculty Research
Fund and the Arnold and Frieda Shure Research Fund in making this work possible.
1. See, e.g., KINGMAN BREWSTER, JR., ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 18-22
(reprinted by Amo Press 1976) (1958).
2. 21 CONG. REC. 1766 (1890)(statement of Sen. George); BREWSTER, supra note 1, at 2 1.
3. This theme is developed more extensively in Diane P. Wood, The Impossible Dream: Real
International Antitrust, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 277.
4. See, e.g., William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
HARv. L. REv. 937 (1981); Symposium on Antitrust Law and the Internationalization of Markets, 64
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 689 (1988).
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between or among U.S. competitors has been debated and has now resulted
in the passage of new legislation;' and even the broad question of whether
a domestic antitrust law is still justified now that there is a global economy
has been examined.6
Without in any way diminishing the importance of any of those
questions, this paper takes a different approach, emphasizing instead the
implications of globalization on the procedural structure of the U.S. antitrust
laws. What are the costs, and the consequences, of the fragmented
enforcement structure characteristic of U.S. law? Does the Parker v.
Brown7 doctrine of "antitrust federalism" continue to make sense (if,
indeed, it ever did)? Should the various industry exemptions from antitrust
law be reexamined, such as the McCarran-Ferguson Act (insurance),8 the
Capper-Volstead Act (agriculture),9 the labor exemption,"0 and the special
5. See the National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-42 (signed
June 10, 1993) (HR 1313). See also H.R. REP. No. 94, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1993), reprinted in 64
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at 717-32 (1993) (noting in particular the "increasingly competitive
international marketplace," "flagging U.S. international competitiveness," and the broad question of the
relationship between the antitrust laws and the loss of technical leadership to foreign firms).
6. For example H.R. 1450, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., (introduced March 24, 1993) is entitled the
Fundamental Competitiveness Act of 1993. Title III of that bill, which deals with cooperative enterprise,
begins with the following:
The Congress finds that-
(1) the globalization of the economy makes antitrust law much less relevant today, and even
counterproductive, than when it was developed;
(2) rapid technological change makes the creation of monopolies unlikely as the pace of product
and process innovation accelerates;
(3) cooperative efforts in today's world are predominantly pro-competitive rather than
anticompetitive; and
(4) changing the United States antitrust laws to mirror the realities of the way in which other
countries enforce anticompetitive statutes would make United States industries more competitive
internationally.
H.R. 1450, § 301. Antitrust is not the villain that bills such as this accuse it of being. See Commentary:
Antitrust and International Competitiveness in the 1990s, 58 ANTITRUST L. J. 591, 592-603 (1989).
Nonetheless, opinion on the other side has been persistent. For an earlier expression of the views
reflected in H.R. 1450, see Baldridge, Luncheon Address, 53 ANTITRUST L. J. 397 (1984).
7. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
8. Ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988)).
9. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1988).
10. Clayton Act, ch. 323 § 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (Current version at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988))
(Hereinafter Clayton Act (using only U.S. Code provisions)), provides that "the labor of a human being
is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed
to forbid the existence and operation of labor ... organizations .... " Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 52
(1988), forbids certain federal injunctions against strikes, boycotts, or picketing. It was strengthened by
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 107 (1988), which deprives the federal courts ofjurisdiction
to issue labor injunctions in most circumstances. In addition to these statutory labor exemptions, the
courts have developed a nonstatutory exemption that governs concerted activities and agreements between
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rules governing competition in sectors such as banking" and
telecommunications? 12 Finally, can the United States and other countries
continue to review and regulate mergers and acquisitions from a competitive
standpoint, each under its own particularized rules, when a great number of
notified transactions in the United States today involve foreign parties or
assets, and the international dimension is equally plain elsewhere? 3 These
are the areas where unilateral domestic law reform is most seriously needed
in response to the globalization of economic markets. With the appropriate
modifications, U.S. antitrust law can continue to preserve the important
benefits of open and competitive markets at home, as it adjusts to the
twenty-first century.
I. THE POWER To ENFORCE
A. Present U.S. Law: A Decentralized System
Although it is well known that the system of antitrust enforcement in the
United States is highly decentralized, it is useful to review precisely how
fragmented it is. In terms of the right to initiate proceedings, it could hardly
be more so; in terms of ultimate formulation of policy, coherence emerges
only to the extent that the federal courts are able to provide it. These
allocations of decision-making responsibility have a profound effect on the
ability of U.S. policymakers to take steps that would integrate U.S. antitrust
law more smoothly into a global system.
labor and nonlabor parties. See Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No.
100, 421 U.S. 616, 635 (1975).
I1. There are a number of statutes that affect competition in the banking industry. See generally
the discussion of financial markets and institutions in ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (A.B.A. Section
of Antitrust Law, 3d ed., 1992). For a specific example, see the Bank Merger Act of 1960, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1828 (1988).
12. Since the Modified Final Judgment was entered in United States v. American Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S.
1001 (1983), competition in the telecommunications industry has, as a practical matter, been regulated
through the district court's supervision of the consent decree.
13. One measure of the importance of the problem is the fact that the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development Committee on Competition Law and Policy has commissioned a study
on the problems of transnational mergers, which was undertaken by Professor Richard Whish, of King's
College, London, and myself. See also Rill and Metallo, The Next Step: Convergence of Procedure and
Enforcement, in 1992 ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FoRDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE:
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY 15-39 (1993).
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1. The Department of Justice Antitrust Division
First among the U.S. enforcers, both by virtue of breadth of powers and
by virtue of history, is the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), which since
1933 has acted through its Antitrust Division to carry out its manifold
responsibilities. 4  The Department is the only entity entitled to seek
criminal sanctions for antitrust violations," and it has used that authority
aggressively. It is also entitled to seek civil injunctions against conduct
violating any of the antitrust laws;' 6 to sue for treble damages on behalf of
the United States; 7 to review mergers and acquisitions meeting statutory
size-of-person and size-of-transaction tests under the Hart-Scott-Rodino
premerger notification procedures; 8 and to engage in competition advocacy
within the executive branch of the government and, through amicus curiae
briefs, in the courts. Together with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
the DOJ represents the interests of the United States in competition law
matters in international fora, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, and many bilateral arrangements. 9
14. ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL 1-17 (2d ed. 1987). In 1903, the Attorney General appointed
an assistant whose responsibilities included matters relating to interstate commerce and the antitrust laws.
Id.
15. Initially, it was a misdemeanor to violate Sherman Act §§ I and 2, which prohibit respectively
agreements to restrain trade and monopolization. The penalties were a fine not exceeding $5,000, or
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, §§ i, 2, 26 Stat. 209
(1890). In 1955, Congress increased the maximum fine to $50,000. Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 281, 69 Stat.
282 (1955). In 1974, Congress amended the statute to upgrade the offenses to felonies, with a maximum
fine of $1,000,000 for a corporation, or $ 100,000 for any other person, or imprisonment of not more than
three years, or both. Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1708 (1974). In 1990, those figures were again
increased, to $10,000,000 for corporations and $350,000 for individuals, with no changes to the
imprisonment term. Pub. L. No. 101-588, § 4(a), 104 Stat. 2880 (1990). In addition, the sentencing
guidelines for U.S. Courts address the specific offenses of bid-rigging, price-fixing, or market-allocation
agreements between competitors in Part R, which governs how these figures are translated in practice,
especially in multiple count cases. See 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 2RI.l (1993).
16. See Clayton Act, supra note 10, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1988).
17. Clayton Act, supra note 10, 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1988).
18. Clayton Act, supra note 10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 18a (1988).
19. For a description of these activities, see Wood, supra note 3, at 288-97.
[Vol. 1: 409
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2. The Federal Trade Commission
In almost every respect, except for criminal jurisdiction, the FTC shares
the responsibility at the federal level to enforce the antitrust laws with the
DOJ. Through its jurisdiction over "unfair methods of competition"
pursuant to § 5 of the FTC Act, the FTC may condemn any practices that
are either actually or potentially harmful to competition, whether or not they
literally fall under one of the other antitrust laws.20  In addition, the
Clayton Act directly authorizes FTC enforcement of its provisions relating
to price discrimination, tying arrangements, mergers and acquisitions, and
interlocking directorates.2  Unlike the DOJ, the FTC does not seek
monetary fines. Its typical sanction is the "cease and desist" order or, in a
merger case, an injunction or an order to divest-in general, equitable
measures.
3. State Attorneys General
State attorneys general have always had some power to enforce the
federal antitrust laws, yet it was not until the 1980s that they became both
highly visible and far more active. Prior to that time, the states could sue
for recovery of damages to the state itself, or they could sue on behalf of a
class of political subdivisions where state law permitted. Suits on a parens
patriae theory were difficult, as the Supreme Court confirmed in Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co.,22 where it held that the state could not seek damages for
injury to its "general economy."23  However, similar suits for injunctive
relief were and are permissible.24 Two key developments combined to
invigorate state enforcement efforts. The first was the addition of sections
4c through 4h to the Clayton Act in 1976, which permit a state attorney
general to bring a parens patriae action for injuries to the property of
natural persons residing in the state.25  The second was the Reagan
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988). See also FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244-45
(1972); II PHILIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, I 305c (1978).
21. Clayton Act, supra note 10, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1988).
22. 405 U.S. 251, 265 (1972).
23. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., supra note 20, at 264.
24. See, e.g., California v. American Stores Co., 492 U.S. 1301 (1989) (state sought to enjoin
merger).
25. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Title Ill, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h
(1988).
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Administration's minimalist antitrust enforcement strategy, which collided
head-on with the more aggressive philosophy that prevailed in most of the
states (often without regard to which political party was in office). Armed
in part with their new powers under the 1976 legislation, and in part with
the coordination provided by the Multistate Antitrust Task Force of the
National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG), the states began to file
some of the most innovative and far-reaching antitrust actions of the
1980s.26 At the same time, the states increased their participation in the
policy-making debate through the devices of combined amicus briefs, which
occurred in cases such as Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. 27
(forty-six states) and Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services,
Inc.28 (twenty-nine states), and the issuance of NAAG Guidelines on
Vertical Restraints and Merger Enforcement."
Thus, even putting aside entirely the fact that most states have state-
level antitrust laws, under which companies may also be liable, they both
have and exercise significant power to enforce all of the federal laws.
Moreover, at times their priorities have been at odds with those of the
federal authorities, as has their understanding of the scope of the laws'
prohibitions.
4. Private Parties
Finally, there is the well known provision of U.S. antitrust law that
permits private parties to sue for treble damages or for injunctive relief to
enforce any of the antitrust laws.3 ° The device of the "private attorney
26. Examples include the Minolta cases, brought by 37 states in a coordinated action to attack
national resale price maintenance. See Troncelliti v. Minolta Corp., 666 F. Supp. 750 (D. Md. 1987),
and In re Minolta Camera Products Antitrust Litigation, 668 F. Supp. 456 (D. Md. 1987), discussed in
Lloyd Constantine, Current Antitrust Enforcement Initiatives by State Attorneys General, 56 ANTITRUST
L.J. 111, 115-16 and n.8 (1987); the suits brought by nineteen states against the insurance industry upon
which the Supreme Court ruled in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 113 S.Ct. 2891 (1993); and
the massive Mitsubishi resale price maintenance action, which Robert Langer described as the first time
that all 50 states filed 50 actions in a single court on the same day. 60 Minutes with Robert M. Langer,
60 ANTITRUST L.J. 197, 199 (1991).
27. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
28. 112 S.Ct. 2072 (1992).
29. 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 50,009 (1988).
30. Clayton Act, supra note 10, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988), authorizes "any person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws" to sue in federal
court, and states that the plaintiff "shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Clayton Act, supra note 10, § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1988),
[Vol. 1: 409
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general" is a central part of the enforcement structure. For private plaintiffs,
monetary penalties serve an important compensatory function as well as the
more traditional deterrence function. The sheer number of persons with an
incentive to detect and prosecute antitrust offenses changes the entire
character of the U.S. law, especially as compared with virtually all other
systems, in which private enforcement plays a minor role or no role at all.
The existence of private parties makes it more difficult for government
policymakers to control developments in antitrust law through the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion, since the courts perforce deal with the full range
of issues." Therefore, it is the judiciary that has the greatest influence on
antitrust policymaking, not the administrators of the laws.32
B. The Global Perspective
Whatever benefits Americans may see in the decentralized system of
antitrust enforcement briefly described above, it is clear that the system
imposes certain costs and disadvantages on those subject to the system (both
Americans and foreigners coming within the jurisdiction of the U.S.
laws).33 In part, these are the inevitable costs of federalism, but on a larger
scale they reflect a conscious decision to foster competition in the
enforcement process itself. No matter what the priorities of any particular
enforcer-federal agency, state, or private-another one is likely to be able
provides that "any person... shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief.., against threatened
loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws," and that "[i]n any action under this section in which
the plaintiff substantially prevails, the court shall award the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee, to such plaintiff."
31. The fate of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988), is a telling example of this
point. It is fair to say that Robinson-Patman enforcement has been of minimal importance to both the
FTC and the DOJ for many years. Nonetheless, private plaintiffs have kept it alive, and the Supreme
Court has rendered a number of important Robinson-Patman decisions throughout the period of
government inaction. See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543 (1990); J. Truett Payne Co. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981) (adopting narrow view of recoverable damages).
32. Naturally, Congress both can and often has enacted particular or general amendments to the
antitrust laws. The discussion in text is not intended to imply that legislative changes are not important.
It is meant only to contrast the executive or administrative model of competition law development with
the judicial model.
33. The extraterritorial reach of the U.S. antitrust laws has been controversial since the U.S.
Supreme Court abandoned the narrow, strictly territorial approach of American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), which it did almost immediately in cases such as United States v. Pacific
& Arctic Railway & Navig. Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913) and United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S.
268 (1927). For a thorough discussion of the extraterritorial application of the laws, see J. ATWOOD &
K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD ch. 6 (2d ed. 1981 and Supp. 1992).
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to present key issues of competition policy to the courts and to ensure that
the laws are not ignored.
1. Lack of Centralized Antitrust Policy
The multiplicity of authorized enforcers of the law noted above has
made the federal judiciary the only locus for the definitive coordination of
substantive antitrust policy. 3 4 By contrast, in systems where antitrust laws
are the exclusive responsibility of a government agency, policy coordination
takes place both in the form of prosecutorial decisionmaking and through
appropriate judicial tribunals.
Further complications arise because the federal courts treat the antitrust
laws as a quasi-common law topic.35 Thus, it is difficult (especially for
foreign parties) to obtain the kind of guidance that expressly articulated
statutory or regulatory norms can provide. It is not uncommon for the U.S.
Supreme Court to decide antitrust cases (like others) in closely divided
opinions.36 In other instances, it can take years before the Supreme Court
resolves conflicting approaches in the courts of appeals." The
complications are detrimental from a global perspective because they tend
34. The DOJ, the state attorneys general, and private parties commence antitrust actions by filing
suit in a federal district court. The FTC, as an administrative agency, conducts its own trial-level
proceedings, but appeals from its decisions go to the appropriate federal court of appeals.
35. See, e.g., Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common Law"
Nature ofAntitrust Law, 60 TEx. L. REv. 661 (1982); Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH.
L. REv. 1696 (1986). For arguments that antitrust ought to have more precise content, see Arthur,
Workable Antitrust Law: The Statutory Approach to Antitrust, 62 TULANE L. REv. 1163 (1988), and
May, Historical Analysis in Antitrust Law, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 857 (1990).
36. For example, the Court's recent decision in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S.Ct. 2891
(1993), had a majority of five Justices on one key issue (international jurisdiction and comity), and a
different majority of five Justices on another key issue (the definition of a boycott for purposes of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act). Further complicating the matter, one participant, Justice White, retired from
the Court at the end of the 1993 term. This phenomenon is not limited to antitrust, of course, but is
especially difficult in a field where judicial decisions are of such central importance to the development
of the law.
37. The most notorious example recently was the standard for finding an attempt to monopolize
under the Sherman Act § 2. For many years, the Ninth Circuit had permitted certain inferences to be
made from a factual finding of anticompetitive conduct. Other circuits required express findings of
specific intent to monopolize a defined relevant market. The Supreme Court allowed this circuit split
to endure from 1964, when the Ninth Circuit first announced its test in Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327
F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964), until 1993, when the Court rejected the
Lessig test in Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S.Ct. 884 (1993).
[Vol. 1: 409
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to create transaction costs within the U.S. market, due to the need to
conform behavior to differing, and often shifting, legal criteria.
2. Lack of Finality in Legal Proceedings
Since there is no claim preclusion effect when one authorized entity
(such as the DOJ) concludes a proceeding, vis A vis other authorized entities
(such as a state or a private party), U.S. firms are at a disadvantage relative
to their foreign counterparts who function in a more certain system. Indeed,
a U.S. government judgment is expressly held to be prima facie evidence
of a violation for a later private suit. In addition, the statute of limitations
is tolled pending the government proceeding, thus encouraging follow-on
litigation. The only coordination that exists is done informally between the
Antitrust Division and the FTC and is described more fully below.
3. Implications for Broader Economic Policymaking
Important though they are, the antitrust laws are not the only ones that
affect the nation's economic policy. Increasingly, the laws regulating
international trade have been recognized as equally important for the nation's
economic health and the effective functioning of both the national and the
world markets." The task of creating an internally consistent set of rules
governing the international dimensions of competition, with particular
emphasis on the relationship between the antitrust laws and the laws
regulating international trade, is necessarily complicated when neither
legislative guidance nor a final arbiter outside the judiciary is available.
38. The international trade laws include the antidumping laws, Trade Act of 1930 § 731 (current
version at 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988); and the countervailing duty laws, Tariff Act of 1930 §§ 303, 701
(current version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1671 (1988)); Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, (current
version at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988)), which governs unfair practices in international trade; Section 301
of the Trade Act of 1974 (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)), which is a broad-based statute
that also governs unfair practices that violate international agreements or that otherwise unreasonably
burden or discriminate against U.S. commerce; and Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (current version
at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-54 (1988)), which provides safeguard protection against fairly traded foreign goods
that are imposing serious injury on a U.S. industry.
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C. Reform Possibilities
1. Proposals in the United States
Before considering whether the global dimension of antitrust policy
requires reforms within the United States, it is important to decide how
serious the various disadvantages outlined above are and to weigh them
against the benefits of the present system. Plainly, if those benefits cannot
be achieved in other ways that are more sensitive to the international
dimension, then changes would be inadvisable. On the other hand, if the
same disadvantages that place pressure on international enforcement are
more generally problematic, then the case for reform becomes stronger.
In fact, the record suggests that the latter hypothesis is closer to the
truth. General efforts have already begun in the United States to address the
difficulties of the existing system, for reasons having little to do with
internationalization. However, it is vitally important that those making these
efforts be informed about the issues arising from internationalization as well,
so that the resulting system will be better suited to the economy of the
future.
With respect to the problems arising from the multiplicity of authorized
antitrust enforcers, perhaps the most important recent development has been
the increasing formalization of efforts to coordinate state enforcement with
federal efforts. In 1992, both the Antitrust Division and the FTC signed
protocols with the state attorneys general to facilitate coordination between
the two sides in merger investigations. 9 Efforts to keep communication
lines open between the federal agencies and the states have intensified.
Much more could still be done in this area, but the signs are encouraging.
Coordination between the Antitrust Division and the FTC remains
informal. In the case of merger investigations, the agencies decide on a
case-by-case basis which agency will be responsible for the transaction
(although traditional industry expertise and similar factors provide some
predictability to the process). With respect to other civil matters,
coordination appears to be even more ad hoc. The wisdom of the dual
39. Protocol for Coordination in Merger Investigations between the Antitrust Division and State
Attorneys General, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 338 (Mar. 12, 1992); FTC Program to
Assist State Law Enforcement Agencies with Merger Investigations, 57 Fed. Reg. 21,795 (1992).
[Vol. 1: 409
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federal enforcement structure has been studied on numerous occasions,4"
and is a subject whose implications go well beyond this article.
Nevertheless, from the standpoint of the coherence of the U.S. antitrust laws
at the global level, the more that can be done to clarify the process
allocating responsibility and the division of jurisdiction between the DOJ
and FTC, the better the situation will be.
With respect to private enforcement, it is important first to distinguish
the areas of antitrust that have come to resemble administrative law (in
particular, mergers and acquisitions, but also research and development and
production joint ventures) from those that follow the classic litigation model.
The "administrative" branches of antitrust law are characterized by various
forms of pre-transaction notification procedures, which result in added
confidence that the federal government will not challenge the transaction.4'
The "litigation" model still prevails for virtually everything else. The federal
agencies have enormous influence over the development of antitrust policy
in the administrative areas, since the courts will never see most cases. Thus,
in those areas it is easier to create the consistency and predictability that are
helpful from the international standpoint. Although prosecutorial discretion
also plays a role in the litigation area, its importance is less because of the
existence of the alternative enforcers.
The private antitrust enforcer has always played an important part in the
U.S. antitrust tradition, both because it has added resources for antitrust
enforcement that the government would not have had, and because it
acknowledges the importance of compensating the victims of antitrust
violations. No matter what the inconveniences from an international
40. See, e.g., 1969 Report of the American Bar Association Commission to Study the Federal
Trade Commission (Kirkpatrick Report) and Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust
Law Special Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission (Kirkpatrick II), 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 43 (1989).
41. In each case, the administrative process does not provide an absolute assurance of immunity.
For mergers and acquisitions, at the end of the review process that applies to qualifying transactions
under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, the parties learn only that the federal agency will not attempt to stop
the deal (or, of course, that it will take some action). For joint ventures reported pursuant to the National
Cooperative Research Act or the new National Cooperative Research and Production Act, the parties
gain only the assurance that treble damages will not be assessed in the event of a private lawsuit.
National Cooperative Research Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-05 (1984); National Cooperative Research and
Production Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-06 (1993). In theory, the government could still bring an action.
However, well advised companies will have made sure that their filing will not attract this kind of
undesired attention. For a general discussion of the transformation of the Antitrust Division into an
administrative agency, see Thomas E. Sullivan, The Antitrust Division as a Regulatory Agency: An
Enforcement Policy in Transition, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 997 (1986).
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viewpoint that arise due to private enforcement, it is a vital part of the entire
U.S. system. Thus, the question here is how to reap the greatest benefits
from private enforcement while at the same time minimizing international
costs.
In the administrative areas, this process has already begun for joint
ventures: notified production and R&D joint ventures enjoy immunity from
treble damages, but injured private parties can still sue for actual damages
and attorneys' fees. Coordination mechanisms of this type could also be
imagined for mergers; for example, one might impose a higher burden of
persuasion on a party challenging a merger if the federal agency has
provided a written justification for a decision not to bring a suit. Note in
this context that the Tunney Act42 already requires a competitive impact
statement for cases that the government wants to resolve by consent decree.
For noncriminal court suits, the government is already able to participate
amicus curiae in private suits. These mechanisms help to alert the courts to
the potential broader implications of a private action. They have proven
especially useful in cases with foreign implications.
2. Examples from Other Countries
Other countries with federal structures, and the European Community
(EC) with its analogous relationship between Community institutions and
Member State institutions, have faced similar issues to those outlined above.
For example, the drafters of the EC's merger regulation went to considerable
effort to produce a "one-stop shopping" system, so that parties would always
know whether the Commission or the various Member States would be
competent.43 It is (almost) never the case that the Commission would
share responsibility with the Member States, as the federal authorities in the
U.S. can share responsibility with the states." The Commission has
42. The Tunney Act, more formally known as the Antitrust Penalties and Procedures Act of 1976,
established formal procedures that had to be followed whenever the Antitrust Division entered into a
consent decree in federal court. It requires publication of the decree, a period of time for public
comments, and the preparation of a competitive impact statement for public scrutiny. Only if the federal
judge determines that entry of the decree would be in the public interest may the case be concluded in
that fashion. Antitrust Prodecures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528 (1974), (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 16(b) (1984)).
43. See Council Regulation 4064/89 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1, as amended by 1990 O.J. (L 257) 15,
establishing a system of merger control in the European Community.
44. 1 say "almost" because Art. 21.3 reserves the right of Member States to take measures to
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recently taken steps to create the same kind of certainty for enforcement
efforts under Article 85(3), under which it is entitled to exempt qualifying
arrangements or groups of arrangements that would otherwise violate Article
85(1).
More generally, the Community has been developing the principle of
subsidiarity,45 pursuant to which enforcement efforts best undertaken at the
Member State level will remain there, while the Commission concentrates
on cases of general Community significance.
II. FEDERALISM AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
A. The Parker Doctrine
The Parker v. Brown doctrine is often known as the state-action
exemption to the federal antitrust laws.46 In fact, it evolved from a
decision of the Supreme Court holding that the 1890 Congress did not
intend to subject the states in their sovereign capacity to the Sherman Act,
and thus, the Sherman Act simply did not cover a California action that
essentially created a raisin growers' cartel. By emphasizing noncoverage,
the Parker Court avoided the necessity of deciding whether a state law that
conflicted with the Sherman Act would be preempted according to normal
principles of federal supremacy.41
Later cases lost sight of this distinction, and applied Parker to the very
different situation of private conduct that was inconsistent with federal
protect legitimate interests, other than those covered by the Merger Regulation, 4064/89, 1989 O.J. (L
395) 1, as amended 1990 O.J. (L 257) 15. Those interests include public security, plurality of the media,
and prudential rules, as well as others approved by the Commission.
45. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1 C.M.L.R. 719 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1988)
[hereinafter Maastricht Treaty]. The Treaty will add a new Article 3b to the Treaty of Rome, which
provides:
[I]n areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Commission shall take
action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives
of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the
Community.
While the meaning of this principle is still being elaborated, its purpose is to delineate more clearly the
appropriate field for Community action, and to discourage what might be called creeping federalism.
46. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The most recent Supreme Court decision at the time
of this writing is FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S.Ct. 2169, 2176-77 (1992) [hereinafter Ticor Title],
discussing the doctrine further.
47. Parker, 317 U.S. at 350.
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antitrust principles, when it was undertaken pursuant to a state statute that
(1) expressly authorized the private conduct, and (2) actively supervised the
state regulatory scheme.4" The second factor was not required when the
entity undertaking the anticompetitive activity, or creating the
anticompetitive regulations, was a municipality (or other subdivision of the
state government). To say that a state could carve out an area of economic
activity that had been subject to the federal antitrust laws, and create an
exemption, was to adopt a peculiar kind of reverse supremacy principle.
Nonetheless, because the Court was concerned that full application of the
antitrust laws to state regulations would effectively destroy the states as
sovereign entities, it took this approach.49
The result of the Parker doctrine in its present form is that there is no
uniform federal-competition policy, which establishes the boundaries
between free competition and regulatory regimes throughout the country.
One state might regulate the trucking industry, and obtain exemptions for it;
another state might regulate the provision of waste disposal services, and
thus weaken antitrust rules in that sector. A third state might have several
cities that do not permit competition among taxicab services or the provision
of ambulance services. For industries with purely local impact, the
consequences of this regime are unimportant. However, many affected
industries have substantial interstate, and even international, dimensions. In
these cases, the "reverse preemption" effects of Parker are undesirable. If
the Parker doctrine were reconceptualized (or, some would argue, returned
accurately to its roots) as a preemption doctrine, antitrust federalism would
be rationalized in a manner both more consistent with the basic U.S.
constitutional structure and more appropriate to the global situation.
B. The Consequences of Parker in the Global Market
The first notable consequence of Parker for the global market is its
effect on the competitiveness of various U.S. sectors. To the extent that the
various state and local regulatory schemes both derogate from the
competition principle in the service of other public goals and affect interstate
and/or foreign commerce, they will impose the same policy choice on the
nation as a whole. Other state regulatory systems might be designed to
48. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
49. Parker, 317 U.S. at 362-63; Ticor Title, 112 S.Ct. at 2176-77.
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address market failures, and thus may have a negligible or a benign effect
on international competitiveness. It is exceedingly difficult to distinguish
the former from the latter. In general, however, a state rule that assured at
least as much competition as federal law would not pose any serious conflict
with the antitrust laws; thus, the concern here is only with state laws that
reduce competition.
A second consequence of Parker is more external in nature. The ability
of U.S. trade negotiators to open foreign markets for U.S. producers is
hampered by the network of state and local regulations that are inconsistent
with federal competition laws, such as "Buy America" laws that permit
boycotts against foreign producers," and local monopolies. It is difficult,
often impossible, for the trade negotiators to persuade foreign governments
that operate their own (often extensive) monopolies to allow access for U.S.
firms, when the foreign governments can point to the state and local
restrictions in the U.S. as equivalent barriers.5
C. Reform
Here again, the EC may have a system worth studying and adapting to
U.S. circumstances. Article 90 of the Treaty of Rome recognizes that
Member States may grant to public or private companies certain special or
exclusive rights, but Member States are not to enact nor maintain in force
any measure that contradicts the Treaty's competition rules." If a company
has been, as Article 90 says, "entrusted with the operation of services of
general economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing
monopoly," it must be subject to the rules of the Treaty, including the
competition rules, except insofar as the rules would obstruct the performance
50. The various "Buy America" laws passed by the federal, state, and local governments in the
United States normally require the purchase of U.S. goods for certain kinds of projects (e.g., purchase
of airplane tickets, subway cars, etc.), or they reserve a certain amount of purchases for local suppliers.
This practice is regulated at the international level by the Procurement Code administered by the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Multilateral Negotiations:
Agreement on Government Procurement, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/211, Apr. 11, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1052.
51. For example, the market for the provision of legal services would presumptively operate more
competitively if lawyers licensed in one state were permitted to offer their services, or to open an office,
in another state, without the need for separate bar admission. A simple registration system would be
sufficient to serve ethical and prudential requirements.
52. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Jan. I, 1958, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, art.
90 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
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of the special function. The EC Commission and the European Court of
Justice have interpreted the exception narrowly, and thereby have made
Article 90 a powerful tool against Member State laws that conflict unduly
with EC competition rules.5 3 The EC competition rules are, according to
the Court of Justice, directly applicable in Member States, and there is a
general supremacy principle for EC law similar to the one found in the U.S.
Constitution.54
In addition, Article 5 of the Treaty of Rome imposes both affirmative
and negative obligations on Member States to ensure the achievement of the
goals of the Treaty. One of those goals is found in Article 3(f), which
calls for "the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the
common market is not distorted."56 Article 5 then provides that:
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general
or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of
this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the
Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the
Community's tasks.... They shall abstain from any measure which
could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.5
Needless to say, the European Community has not gone so far as to define
any Member State law that replaces competitive markets with a regulatory
scheme as being inconsistent with the objectives of the Treaty, nor will it
ever do so. As the U.S. Supreme Court correctly recognized, such a
sweeping doctrine would mean the end of Member State authority over local
economic regulation.5" On the contrary, a "sufficient" effect on trade
between Member States is a prerequisite for application of the EC
competition rules. It is interesting to speculate whether the required effect
is defacto greater when the question is one of conflict with a Member State
53. Id. See also, case 1377, G.B.-INNO-B.M. NV v. Vereniging van de Kleinhandelaars in
Tabak, 1977 E.C.R. 2115; case 136/86, Bureau National Interprofessionel du Cognac v. Yves Aubert,
1987 E.C.R. 4789. See generally, case T-76/89, Independent Television Publ. Ltd. v. Commission, 1991
E.C.R. 575.
54. See G. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 192-203
(1993).
55. EEC Treaty, supra note 52, art. 5.
56. Id. art. 3(0.
57. Id. art. 5.
58. Parker, 317 U.S. at 362-63; Ticor Title, 112 S.Ct. at 2176-77.
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law, rather than one of assessing private conduct that does not claim such
protection. It is also interesting to consider if and how this type of test for
effects on interstate commerce might be developed in the United States.
Such a test would distinguish actions undertaken at the behest of a state,
which would be preempted by the federal antitrust law only if the interstate
effects were significant, while other actions would continue to be subject to
the de minimus test for interstate commerce that has been developed.
The critical point to note here is the pressure both systems feel from the
increasing internationalization of world markets. Given the choice, business
actors would rather cope with two or three widely applicable sets of law,
rather than fifty-one in the United States, and twelve (or more, when the
Community expands) in Europe. Multiple legal systems give rise to
transaction costs and carry with them the risks of protectionist measures.
Changes will come only as quickly as the individual nations and regions
want them. However, when it comes, I predict that internationalization will
have the effect of diminishing the role of local governments and enhancing
that of central governments. In other words, the need for action at the
national level (for the United States) or the Community level, for the
reasons of efficiency and effectiveness identified in the subsidiarity
principle, is quite likely to increase over time.
III. FEDERAL INDUSTRY EXEMPTIONS
In the United States, as elsewhere, there are a number of federal
exemptions from the antitrust laws. Indeed, the pressure to enact additional
exemptions appears to be building, as different industries and interest groups
attempt to persuade Congress that they can survive only if they need not
face the rigors of competition. The effect of this network of exemptions is
similar to the general federalism exemption discussed above: it creates
different legal regimes for each industry, thereby increasing transaction costs
and risking inefficiency. However, the federal exemptions often go hand-in-
hand with other federal programs that protect the industries in question from
foreign competition. As such, they are doubly suspect from the standpoint
of efficiency.
The major areas that are expressly exempt from the antitrust laws due
to particular rules of federal law include the following:
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The government motivations that lie behind these exemptions are varied.
In the case of agricultural cooperatives, Congress apparently believed that
farmers needed to be able to organize so that their bargaining power would
equal that of the middlemen to whom they sold. In the case of labor unions,
the idea of countervailing power was also crucial, although social and
political factors relating to the autonomy of individuals over their own labor
also played a part. The insurance and banking exemptions reflected a
preference for state regulation over federal. Telecommunications was a
sector (until very recently) subject to a comprehensive regulatory scheme,
rather than general antitrust principles. Finally, the export trade exemptions
were based in part on a desire to encourage U.S. exports, and in part on the
idea that U.S. law does not normally regulate anticompetitive effects outside
the United States. These exemptions reflected a variety of motives, many
of which are not squarely based on market failures. Additional examples are
59. See the Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1988), and Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17
(1988).
60. See Clayton Act, supra note 10, §§ 6, 20, 15 U.S.C. §§ 17, 52 (1988); Norris-LaGuardia Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 101-107 (1988); Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No.
100, 421 U.S. 616, 635 (1975).
61. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-13 (1988), stating that the antitrust laws are
"only applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State
law," but noting that federal antitrust law remains fully applicable to insurance boycotts. (Some have
argued that this does expressly by statute what the Parker doctrine now does for other areas.)
62. See Bank Merger Act of 1960, 12 U.S.C. § 1929 (1988).
63. Although the principal source of the modifications of the antitrust laws for this industry is
found in the Modified Final Judgment in the AT&T litigation, rather than a federal statute, the judgment
has had a profound effect on competition within this industry for a decade, and as such, deserves mention
here. See United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra note 12, at 131.
64. Two exemptions exist here. First, the Webb Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1988),
exempts agreements entered into by a registered association for the sole purpose of engaging in export
trade. Second, under Title III of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4012-21
(1988), applicants may receive an Export Certificate of Review from the Commerce Department (with
the concurrent approval of the Attorney General), which offers a different kind of protection for exporting
activities.
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even more particularized, such as those for certain professional sports, soft
drink bottlers, and newspapers.
As noted above, the risk of continuing with these special regimes
includes the inefficiency that lack of competition brings, as well as the risk
of bringing on protective international trade regimes. To the extent that
important social interests are served by exemptions from competition, U.S.
businesses and individuals should expect to find similar exemptions, or at
least similarly justified exemptions, in overseas markets. However, if these
exemptions are not gradually reduced over time, the process of globalization
itself may slow down or be arrested, as the barriers to international
commerce become more difficult to surmount.
IV. MERGER REGULATION
The internationalization of the merger and acquisition markets is
proceeding apace. For example, a great percentage of the mandatory
premerger notifications in the United States made pursuant to the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act (perhaps as many as one-third) involve either foreign parties or
significant foreign assets.65 The world-wide nature of these markets has
led in many cases to the need to seek regulatory approval from several
different authorities, even when the merging companies might not expect
this.
The reason for the unexpected scope of foreign-merger review authority
might be termed the "victory" of extraterritoriality. For years the United
States took the position that actions abroad with significant (that is, direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable) effects could be regulated by U.S.
law. Other countries are increasingly following this lead. For example,
some version of extraterritorial regulation of mergers exist in the European
Community, Canada, and Germany. The EC will regulate a merger if the
anticompetitive aspects of the agreement are "implemented" within the
Common Market. Implementation means only that the products are sold at
a fixed (or enhanced) price.
The result is that transactions that once might have been subject to only
one country's review processes are now being investigated by two, three, or
even more authorities. For example, the 1989 Gillette/Wilkinson acquisition
65. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Title III, 15 U.S.C. § 15(c)- 15(h)
(1988).
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was reviewed (either formally or informally) by the following agencies: the
Australian Trade Practices Commission, the Brazilian Conselho
Administratino de Defesa Economica (CADE), the Canadian Bureau of
Competition Policy, the European Commission, the French Conseil de la
Concurrence, the German Federal Cartel Office, the Irish Fair Trade
Commission, the South African Competition Board, the Spanish Department
for the Defense of Competition, the Swedish Office of the Competition
Ombudsman, the Swiss Cartel Commission, the U.K. Office of Fair Trade
and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, the United States Department
of Justice, and the New Zealand Commerce Commission.66
Both firms and the public suffer because of the transaction costs that
result from multiple reviews. To obtain approval for one transaction, which
far more often than not will be at least competitively neutral if not positively
desirable, parties must complete each agency's unique form and furnish
different sets of information according to different timetables designed to
meet a wide variety of substantive standards. Each regulating jurisdiction
will be working to serve the broader interest of "competition," as well as
any other statutory criteria that are relevant under local law. Agencies also
suffer from multiple reviews since they may be played off against one
another. For instance, it is difficult for one agency to take advantage of
another's basic background work on market definition.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development is
currently studying reform, through a project studying particular cases
undertaken by Prof. Richard Whish and myself.67 Specifically, we were
charged to review procedures employed by the Member Countries, to
identify the areas of procedural difference that impede cooperation and add
unnecessary regulatory costs, and to suggest potential areas of regulatory
convergence and cooperation. In the absence of substantive convergence,
there are limits on the usefulness of procedural measures that can be taken.
For example, merger filing forms require information that is relevant to each
authority's governing substantive law, and the scope of the forms is a direct
result of the timetable for action that the agency must respect.
66. This information will be published when the OECD Merger Process Convergence Project
Report is available. The author was one of the consultants for the project and may be consulted for a
copy of the report.
67. Richard Whish is Professor of Law at King's College, London. The study described in the
text will be available from the OECD in Paris, France, in mid-1994.
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Confidentiality rules in virtually every country impose significant limitations
on the amount of interagency cooperation that can occur in the absence of
a formal legal assistance treaty.
Nevertheless, the project makes clear the importance of further progress
on these matters, for the simple reason that more and more transactions will
be affecting two or more countries. National boundaries have disappeared
for major business transactions, and the legal systems have no choice but to
catch up.
V. CONCLUSION
The globalization of law, politics, and markets has already had an effect
on U.S. antitrust law and on the antitrust or competition laws of other
countries. In some instances, that effect has plainly reflected the demands
of internationalization. This explains the long-standing efforts in the United
States to enforce the laws against foreign parties when their actions affect
U.S. markets and the increasing need to coordinate antitrust policy with
international trade rules. In other instances, the effect is more subtle. For
example, as merger filing forms are reviewed, the global nature of mergers
and acquisitions will affect the kinds of questions that are asked and the
degree of cooperation that is sought with foreign agencies. Antitrust
exemptions are already being reviewed with an eye toward implications on
international competitiveness; the risk is that the false assumption will be
made that antitrust is incompatible with strong U.S. industries. In fact, the
contrary is true. Global welfare as a whole will be enhanced as more and
more countries work to assure open and competitive markets.
Domestic law reforms cannot be undertaken at the expense of the
fundamental principles of competition that underlie the antitrust laws and
their counterparts elsewhere. The direction of reform must be clearly
pointed toward more scope for competition, protection of the competitive
process, and concern for consumer welfare. Technology has assured that
globalization is here to stay. Sensible domestic law adjustments can assure
that its benefits will be realized by as many people as possible.
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